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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff7Appellee, : 
v. : 
WINTRON NUNEZ, : Case No. 20010019-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
The Honorable Roger A. Livingston, Judge, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, entered judgment of conviction for unlawful distribution of a controlled 
substance in a public park, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2000). R. 123. A copy of the judgment is in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the 
jury on the lesser offense of attempted possession of a controlled substance which was 
requested by the defendant in support of his defense? 
Standard of Review. The trial judge's refusal to give a lesser offense jury 
instruction requested by the defense involves a legal question which is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Simpson. 904 P.2d 709, 711 (Utah App. 1995). 
Preservation. This issue was preserved at R. 147:91, 160-69, a copy of which is in 
Addendum B. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES 
The text of the following statute is in Addendum C: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2000). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 20, 2000, the state charged Defendant/Appellant Wintron Nunez 
("Appellant" or "Nunez") with one count of "unlawful distribution, offering, agreeing, 
consenting or arranging to distribute" a controlled substance in a public park, a second 
degree felony. R. 7-8. A jury trial was held on October 24, 2000. R. 147. The jury 
convicted Nunez as charged. R. 84. Following sentencing on December 4, 2000, Nunez 
filed a timely notice of appeal on December 15, 2000. R. 125. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 14, 2000, Salt Lake City Police Officer Tyrone Farillas was working in 
thePioneerParkandshelter area of Salt Lake City. R. 147:94-5. Officer Farillas, who 
had been a police officer for three years, was working undercover. R. 147:94-5. He 
wore a wire and was working with six other officers who were not undercover. 
R. 147:96, 112. 
During the 3:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. shift that the team worked on June 14, 2000, 
Officer Farillas and the others made eight to nine arrests. R. 147:96, 110. Farillas was 
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the undercover officer in each of those arrests and wrote reports for each arrest. 
R. 147:110. Farillas could not remember whether the incident in this case was the first 
undercover buy he attempted to make that evening. R. 147:111. He also was unclear as 
to the time at which this occurred, initially testifying that it was around 8:00 p.m., but 
later acknowledging that his report showed it was 5:03 p.m. R. 147:103, 112. 
After Officer Farillas walked into the northwest corner of Pioneer Park, he was 
approached by a black male, Claude Ryans, Jr., who asked undercover officer Farillas 
whether Farillas had any "mota." R. 147:97, 103. ,fMota" is a term used to refer to 
marijuana. R. 147:97. 
Farillas and Ryans were together by themselves for three minutes. R. 147:98. 
They then saw another black male, Appellant, walking on 300 south towards the park. 
R. 147:98. 
The pair made contact with Nunez, and Ryans asked Nunez for some mota. 
R. 147:98. Farillas testified that Appellant said, "I don't have any, but I can -1 can -1 can 
find it for you." R. 147:99. Farillas then told Nunez that he, too, was looking for mota. 
R. 147:99. Nunez said, "follow me." R. 147:99. 
The trio walked westbound on 300 South. R. 147:99. Farillas told Nunez that he 
wanted $20 worth of marijuana. R. 147:99. Ryans said he was looking for $10 worth of 
marijuana. R. 147:100. 
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Nunez told the pair he had a friend at the shelter named Steve who could probably 
hook Ryans and Farillas up with some marijuana. R. 147:100. Nunez, Farillas and Ryans 
walked to the shelter, which the officer testified was within 1000 feet of the park. 
R. 147:101. Nunez told Ryans and Farillas to wait while Nunez got his friend, Steve. 
R. 147:101. Nunez returned without Steve and told Ryans and Farillas that Steve had run 
out of marijuana that morning. R. 147:102. 
Nunez told Farillas and Ryans that he knew another guy who might have 
marijuana, and told the pair to follow him again. R. 147:102. They walked back toward 
the Salvation Army food line where the other person often hung out. R. 147:102. The 
other person was not at the food line, however. R. 147:104. 
Nunez told Farillas and Ryans to follow him back into the park. R. 147:104. They 
walked side by side, three abreast, to the northwest corner of the park, where they saw a 
white female. R. 147:104, 121. Ryans was closest to the female and Farillas the farthest 
away from her. R. 147:122. According to the officer, Nunez and the female talked for a 
maximum of thirty seconds, while the officer and Ryans stayed back about ten feet away. 
R. 147:104, 117. Farillas could not hear anything they said. R. 147:105. Nunez then 
said, "follow us" and they followed Nunez and the female back to the food line. 
R. 147:104. 
The female, Rebecca Hellman, motioned Farillas and Ryans to sit by her. 
R. 147:104, 151. She said, "How much are you looking for?" R. 04. Farillas said, "20." 
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R. 147:104. Prior to that, Farillas had not talked with the female nor indicated to her that 
he wanted to buy marijuana. R. 147:110. 
Hellman took two baggies of marijuana from her sock and handed them to Farillas. 
R. 147:104. Farillas gave her $20, then got up and walked over to Appellant, who was 
standing about four feet away. R. 147:104. Nunez wanted some of the marijuana, and 
told Farillas to wait for him. R. 147:104, 109. Farillas observed Ryans give the female a 
$10 bill while waiting for the arrest team to arrive. R. 147:106. 
Farillas acknowledged that throughout this incident, he, Nunez and Ryans "were 
just kind of hanging out together." R. 147:123. The atmosphere was not businesslike. 
R. 147:123. When Nunez and Hellman began talking, there was no indication that they 
knew each other. R. 147:124. 
Farillas stated that it was a "done deal," which told the officers who were listening 
over the wire that a transaction had taken place. R. 147:105. The officers arrived and 
arrested everyone, including Farillas. R. 147:117. Ms. Hellman slipped out of her 
handcuffs and ran. R. 147:119. 
Claude Ryans testified that on June 14, he picked up his paycheck then went to 
Pioneer Park to look for some marijuana. R. 147:145. He approached a group which 
included Nunez and asked whether they knew where he could find some marijuana and 
that he would give them a joint if they helped him find some. R. 147:146. Nunez told 
Ryans he did not smoke marijuana, then the group went looking for some marijuana. 
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R. 147:146. Ryans did not know Nunez before that day. R. 147:146. 
Nunez testified that Officer Farillas approached him and Ryans and asked whether 
they knew where to find marijuana. R. 147:150. Nunez responded, "I don't know." 
R. 148:150. Nunez also told Farillas that he had a friend named Steve who usually had 
marijuana. R. 147:150. Farillas, Ryans and Nunez looked for Steve but could not find 
him. R. 147:150. They walked back towards the park and Hellman approached them. 
R. 147:151. Nunez testified that he did not talk with Hellman. R. 147:151. Instead, she 
asked the three what they were looking for. R. 147:152. Farillas responded that he was 
looking for twenty dollars worth of marijuana. R. 147:152. Ryans, Hellman and Farillas 
then made their transactions. R. 147:154. Nunez was not involved and was not watching 
what happened. R. 147:154. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on the 
lesser offense of attempted possession of a controlled substance, as requested by the 
defendant. When a defendant requests a lesser offense instruction, due process is violated 
by the failure to give such an instruction where (1) the charged offense and the requested 
lesser offense have overlapping elements, and (2) the evidence viewed in the light most 
favorable to the defense demonstrates a rational basis for acquitting the defendant of the 
charged offense and convicting him of the lesser offense. In this case where both of these 
requirements were met, the trial court violated Appellant's right to due process and 
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committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury on attempted possession of a 
controlled substance. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON ATTEMPTED 
POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA, A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
INSTRUCTION REQUESTED BY THE DEFENSE IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
THEORY OF THE CASE. 
The defense requested that the trial judge instruct the jury on attempted possession 
of marijuana. R. 147:91, 160-66. The trial judge denied the motion, reasoning that the 
defense was not entitled to that lesser included instruction because "there are no facts 
upon which, in my view, a jury would render that verdict." R. 147:169. In refusing to 
instruct the jury on the defense theory of the case, the trial judge committed reversible 
error. 
Different concerns exist when the defendant requests a lesser included offense 
instruction than when the prosecution requests such an instruction. See State v. Carruthu 
1999 UT 107, f6, 993 P.2d 869. When the prosecution requests a lesser instruction, all of 
the elements of the lesser crime must necessarily be included in the crime charged in 
order to give the defendant notice. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 155 (Utah 1983). By 
contrast, the concern when the defendant requests a lesser instruction is that the defendant 
be given the "full benefit" of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Carruth, 
1999 UT 107, Tf6 (quoting Baker, 671 P.2d at 156.) Accordingly, 
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when the defendant requests a lesser included offense instruction, the 
standard is somewhat different. In that situation, there must be some 
overlapping of the statutory elements of the offenses. If that overlapping 
exists and the evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to alternative 
interpretations, the trial court must give a lesser included offense instruction 
if any one of the alternative interpretations provides both a "rational basis 
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting 
him of the included offense." 
State v. Oldrovd. 685 P.2d 551, 553-54 (Utah 1984) (citations omitted). 
While a defendant's right to a lesser included offense instruction is not absolute or 
unqualified, it nevertheless requires a lesser included offense instruction under less 
stringent standards than are required when the prosecution requests a lesser instruction. 
See Baker, 671 P.2d at 157-58. Moreover, due process requires that such an instruction 
be given when the evidence warrants it. Id at 157 (citations omitted). 
Hence, when a defendant requests a lesser included offense instruction, such an 
instruction must be given when (1) the offense is included in that at least some of the 
statutory elements overlap, and (2) there is a "'rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.'" Baker, 
671 P.2d at 159 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1953 as amended)). In discussing 
the second aspect of this test, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
This standard does not require the court to weigh the credibility of the 
evidence, a function reserved for the trier of fact. The court must only 
decide whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence presented to justify 
sending the question to the jury, a decision which must be made concerning 
all jury instructions in any trial. When the elements of two offenses 
overlap . . . if there is a sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a jury 
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question regarding a lesser offense, then the court should instruct the jury 
regarding the lesser offense. Similarly, when the evidence is ambiguous 
and therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one alternative 
would permit acquittal of the greater offense and conviction of the lesser, a 
jury question exists and the court must give the lesser included offense 
instruction at the request of the defendant This situation will often arise 
when the critical question is either the credibility of certain evidence or the 
determination of what inferences may legitimately be made on the basis of 
the evidence. 
Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. In the present case, both aspects of the relevant test w en n.il nil 
(he trial court s failure to give Nunez's requested instruction on the lesser offense of 
jflt'tnpkii possession il m,u i|u;uiii therefore violated due process. 
First, the statutory element', oi'disirihii' "" i i injti;ii»;i jud possession of 
marijuana overlap. The statute under which the state charged Nunez iiKikes 11 unl.iss lul lo 
"distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to 
ihsliibnle a ctmilrolled in counterfeit substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) 
(1998). The Informs* . ^ included as an element 
distributing, offering, agreeing, consenting or arrangim 
substance. 7? n 94 Since distribution requires possession of the controlled substance, 
1 rr LV oi distribution of marijuana pursuant to section 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) 
and possession ui * •* * * unl In «.n;lit»ji >K \ '!• Si 2 Hei overlap. Morever, since 
arranging involves anticipation of possession, as does 11 \ \ a (t e 1111 \ \ i n j i n •»s <: si i in i w o 
statutes overlap. 
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Second, the evidence in this case supports giving a lesser included instruction on 
the offense of attempted possession since it provided a basis for acquitting Nunez of 
distribution and convicting him solely of attempted possession. In assessing that 
evidence, this Court does not weigh the evidence or consider whether there was credible 
evidence to support a conviction. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d at 555. Instead, this Court must 
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. Id. 
The defense in this case was that Nunez did not "arrange" a drug deal. Instead, 
Nunez, Ryans and Farillas were simply hanging out and "all went on a search together." 
R. 147:211. 
The evidence supported this defense and provided a basis for acquitting Nunez of 
arranging the distribution of marijuana. Officer Farillas and Ryans hooked up in Pioneer 
Park and Ryans asked the officer whether he had marijuana. R. 147:97, 103. They then 
made contact with Nunez and asked him for marijuana. R. 147:98. Nunez did not have 
marijuana but thought he could find Steve, who often had matrijuana. R. 147:99. The trio 
then ambled around the Pioneer Park/shelter area, looking for Steve or someone else who 
sometimes had marijuana. R. 147:99-100. The trio did not find Steve or the other person. 
After wandering around for awhile, the three headed back toward Pioneer Park. 
Officer Farillas acknowledged that throughout this encounter, Nunez, Ryans and Farillas 
were "just kind of hanging out together" and that the atmosphere was not businesslike. 
R. 147:123. After the trio returned to Pioneer Park, they hooked up with Hellman. 
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Nunez testified that he never talked with Iltiliniii I" I I ' I I Imli.uJ. I 1LIIIII.II} asked 
the three what they were looking for, and Farillas responded that he was looking foi 
! vcnly dollars worth of marijuana R 147:152. Farillas and Ryans talked with Hellman 
withe „ x . 4 . Nunez wanted to share 
some of the marijuana and told Farillas U»\\ nil af1«;r I1 •; - made lir, iic;jl w ilh I lellman. 
R 147:104, 109. 
In assessing whether the trial court was required to give the defendant's requested 
unit II< "li HI tin .., \ i ikna imisl be viewed in the light most favorable to the defense. 
Oldroyd, 685 P.2d at 55 : : r , v i ^ \. v_i,viv. v, anez 
merely hung out with the officer and Ryans while the three wande t y 
tried to locate some marijuana, the jury could have found that Nunez's actions did not rise 
if-""'""" "I" <» i,'I - 1 it ranging ' a drug deal. Moreover, Nunez testified that he did not talk 
with Hellman and th< previously know Hellman. 
Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to ilu* dcU'tiM\ ih» |im < 1 w id w\\ <: 
determined that although Nunez hung out with the officer looking for someone who 
i ;.;.:; • narijuaiia, he did not arrange the deal with Hellman because he did not speak 
to her. 
• • The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable (o (hi • defense- lil\o.\ isi pi 1 n HIlnl 
a rational basis for convicting Nunez of the lesser charge. Farillas, Ryans and Nunc 
wandered around looking for someone with marijuana. When Farillas made his deal, 
Nunez immediately told him to wait so that Nunez could share the marijuana. 
R. 147:104, 109. Given this evidence, the jury could reasonably have found that Nunez 
did not arrange a deal but instead was hanging out with Farillas and Ryans in the hope 
that he would get some marijuana. Accordingly, there was a rational basis for convicting 
Nunez of the lesser offense of attempted possession of marijuana., 
A trial court's error in failing to give a lesser instruction requested by the defense 
requires a new trial. See Oldroyd, 685 P.2d at 556 (reversing conviction and remanding 
for new trial where trial judge erred in failing to give defendant's requested instruction). 
Reversal is required because the failure to give a defendant's lesser instruction deprives 
the defendant of the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard, thereby depriving the 
defendant of a fair trial. See id. (citing Baker, 671 P.2d at 157). In this case where the 
trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of attempted possession of a 
controlled substance, as requested by the defendant, Appellant's right to due process was 
violated and a new trial is required. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Wintron Nunez respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction and remand his case for a new trial. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED I hi, ^ ^ il,i\ nl'Mi.\. Jiliil. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt 
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o.c^ur 
OAN C. WATT 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WINTRON DAVID NUNEZ, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001910707 FS 
Judge: ROGER A. LIVINGSTON 
Date: December 4, 2000 
PRESENT 
Clerk: ginam 
Prosecutor: JEFF HALL 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DEBORAH KREECKMENDEZ 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 26, 1961 
Video 
Tape Count: 11:17 
CHARGES 
X. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/24/2000 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
DIST C/S a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Page 1 
\^-\ 1 
Case No: 001910707 
Date: Dec 04, 2000 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
DIST C/S a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 365 day(s) 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 163 day(s) previously served. 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
C/o deft to serve 1 year in jail, cts, concurrent. Deft may be 
released for extradition to California. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by GOOD BEHAVIOR PROBATION. 
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Violate no laws. 
£ _ day ot(^{LfV)h2sS. 2<P0„-. Dated this _j _ -
tri/t 
ROGER pj. LIVI^GSTO: 
Dis c Courtuudge 
Page 2 (last) 
\VA 
ADDENDUM B 
MS. WISSLER: - "we further do or do not find that 
this offense took place in or within 1,000 feet of public 
park." 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: And, your Honor, I am going to 
ask that a lesser included — and we can't decide that till the 
evidence is in, but the lesser included attempted possession of 
a controlled substance. And so we'll need a special verdict 
form for that, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Attempted possession or attempted 
distribution? 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: Attempted possession. 
THE COURT: A Class C? 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: A Class C misdemeanor. But it 
would be — then there would need to be the special verdict to 
enhance it to — for being in the park. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let me say this. Can 
you by 4:00 o'clock have a verdict form that you want — 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: Uh-huh. (affirmative) 
THE COURT: - and whatever. I don't think I can 
delegate that to Gina to have done because we don't know what 
exactly that you're going to do. So I'm just giving you heads 
up. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: That's fine. 
THE COURT: We're not going to do verdict forms. 
MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: Okay. 
91 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MS. WISSLER: Judge 
form which you asked 
THE 
MS. 
COURT: 
, also I have a 
us to prepare. 
Oh, great. Okay. 
WISSLER: And I 
objection to this form. 
MS. KREECK-
then mine is coming . 
| issue. 
and see 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
COURT: 
KREECK-
COURT: 
-MENDEZ: 
in. 
Okay. 
-MENDEZ: 
And we' 
what she wants to do. 
if you want, just a I 
now, or 
I think 
| record, 
say. 
do you want 
we can talk 
MS. 
THE 
THE 
THE 
KREECK 
COURT: 
CLERK: 
COURT: 
Tioment. 
to wait t 
about it 
-MENDEZ: 
Let me 
Is this 
Sure. 
understand 
There's no 
I guess we 
that 
special 
there's 
objection to 
need 
11 let Ms. Wissl 
to deal 
er look 
Okay. You guys all be 
Is it all right 
ill the verdict 
on its way, 
I think we 
— you know -
can7 
can 
on the record? 
You'd better put 
^cause Ms. Kreeck-Mendez may not 
MS. 
THE 
KREECK 
COURT: 
it seems to me, that 
arrangi] ng case, you 
-MENDEZ: I wouldn't 
And that is, while 
in any distribution 
have the 
like 
at a 
to talk 
verdict 
no 
that, and 
with the 
at that 
seated, 
about that 
form comes over? 
t we? 
discuss 
this on 
what I 
11. 
it is genera 
case 
lesser included 
, or off 
it. 
the 
have to 
lly true, 
'ering or 
of possession. I 
160 | 
1 think that is ipso facto true in 99 percent of the fact I 
2 patterns. It seems to me in this particular case there is no 
3 evidence that Mr. Nunez possessed marijuana, or indeed that he 
4 attempted to possess it. 
5 As I understand the State's evidence — and I take it 
6 in the light most favorable to the State at this point — that 
7 what they have is evidence that Mr. Nunez facilitated the 
8 distribution of marijuana from another party to this undercover 
9 officer, but he never either possessed — had in his control or 
10 dominion — a substance [unintelligible] marijuana, nor did he 
11 ever attempt to. 
12 In other words, the facts are different than him 
13 taking it from party A and giving to party B. I just think 
14 that the State's case is one of facilitation, introduction, and 
fL5 here's the — I know where a buyer is and I know where a seller 
16 is, and here are you two guys, and they consummated the deal. 
17 And I just don't know if there's any evidence upon which the 
18 jury could reasonably find that Mr. Nunez either possessed or 
19 took a substantial step toward possessing it himself. 
20 So it's not as a theoretical matter that I have any 
21 problem with it, and I think that 99 percent of time I would 
22 grant the motion to have a lesser included, but I just don't 
23 see how it fits the facts of this case, and I'd be curious to 
24 hear how you think it does. 
25 MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: Your Honor, I think it fits the 
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1 facts clearly because Officer Farillas, by the State's own 
2 evidence — let's just work with what the State presented — 
3 testified that Mr. Nunez asked to use the marijuana. This was 
4 merely a way for him to get some marijuana, by the State's 
5 case — 
6 THE COURT: Oh. 
7 MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: - to use. He was in no benefit. 
8 His only benefit is he says, MHey, wait for me. I want to 
9 share with you." I think you can take it one step further 
10 where you have Mr. Ryans saying, he says, "Well, I'll give you 
11 a joint or I'll give a beer. I'll share with you." 
12 But I think — I think the jury has the evidence 
13 before it, by Officer Farillas's own testimony, that Mr. Nunez 
14 was merely trying to help him get the drugs so he could attempt 
15 it to possess himself. He didn't actually get to possess it 
16 because the officers arrested them. But his intent, had 
17 Mr. Farillas not been a police officer, was that all three of 
18 them were going to sit down and use it. 
19 That's what Officer Farillas testified, and I think 
20 that is a substantial piece of evidence. It's the State's 
21 evidence, and I think that at least the jury should be able to 
22 have the instruction to decide if this wasn't merely just an 
23 attempt to possess on his own behalf. 
24 THE COURT: Let me just ask one other question, then. 
25 MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: Uh-huh. (affirmative) 
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1 THE COURT: You know, it seems to me the State could 
2 have charged, based upon the — certainly they could have 
3 charged, in addition to the offering or arranging, they could 
4 have charged a C, attempt to possess, because after one crime 
5 was committed and that's a consummated deal, then he, in 
6 addition to that, attempts to possess some himself. 
7 So I'm not - let me just pare back what I think I 
8 heard you say, and that is that in addition to the State 
9 claiming that he facilitated the transaction from A to B, once 
10 B had the stuff, he tried to get B to share it with him. I'm 
11 not sure. Because that's an uncharged crime, do you get to 
12 have that be a lesser included of the main crime where there's 
13 no facts upon which the jury could reasonably find that in lieu 
14 of the main? 
15 I guess what I'm saying is, is it possible that a 
16 jury could disbelieve the first part of the officer's 
17 testimony, but then, I guess, believe an aside that's not even 
18 charged? 
19 MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: Well, I think it goes to 
20 knowing — the knowing and intentional. What was — what did 
21 Mr. Nunez intend to do here? Facilitate a distribution, or 
22 facilitate his possession? And it kind of goes back to my oral 
23 arguments. 
24 Mr. Ryans wasn't even charged in this matter. The 
^5 State had a choice. They had some choices here. One was they 
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1 could have gone with city ordinance that we argued — that I had 
2 filed a motion on. Here, it goes to his intent. And I think, 
3 clearly, the jury gets to decide. Was he intending to aid in a 
4 distribution? Was he intending to get his own drugs here? 
5 And I think that Officer Farillas's testimony puts in 
6 issue, factually — 
7 THE COURT: Okay. 
8 MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: - what his intent was. 
9 THE COURT: Let me ask it one other way, just so I 
10 understand your position. And that is, what if it is true his 
11 subjective intent, in introducing A to B, is so that he gets 
12 some of the drugs that B gets? How does that negate the fact, 
13 if the jury finds that, that he in fact facilitated, assisted, 
14 arranged, the transfer of A to B? The fact that not only was 
15 he an entrepreneur, but now he wants to share in the proceeds. 
16 I'm not sure why — lesser included means he didn't do 
17 the higher; he only did the lower. 
18 MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: It goes to intent, your Honor. 
19 What was his intent here? Was his intent to aid, or was his 
20 intent to attempt to possess? And I think that clearly we have 
21 enough evidence that the jury needs to decide that. What was 
22 his intent? That's the key issue here. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Well, let just paraphrase. I want 
24 to make sure I'm hearing you. What I think I really hear you 
25 saying is — with all respect to you. And I think you might be 
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1 confusing, or wanting me to confuse, motive and intent. What I 
2 think I hear you saying is, his real motive of this was to get 
3 some pot to smoke himself. 
4 And if that's his motive, that's okay, but I'm not 
5 sure, because that's his underlying motive, that that negates 
6 the intent of "Hi, A, this is B. B, this is A. I think you 
7 guys ought to" — you know, he brings them together, the intent 
8 meaning that he intentionally — volitionally engages in conduct 
9 to facilitate the transfer of drugs. 
10 The fact that his subjective desire or motivation in 
11 all of this is so he gets some marijuana to smoke too, I really 
12 think I hear what — what I really think I hear you saying is 
13 that this is his motive, but that's different than intent. So 
14 that's kind of -
15 MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: See, my opinion is that motive — 
16 it doesn't — motive is not the issue here. So I am saying it's 
17 intent. What is his intent? His intent here is to acquire 
18 marijuana. 
19 THE COURT: Yeah. Intent really goes to the 
20 voluntariness of the act. 
21 MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: Well, I think it goes to what 
22 he — was he intentionally seeking to aid and abet? No. He was 
23 intentionally seeking to acquire marijuana. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. 
25 MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: I mean not aid and abet. 
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1 THE COURT: I understand your position. 
2 MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: Was he intentionally seeking to 
3 aid? 
4 THE COURT: Well, let's see, first of all, maybe 
5 Ms. Wissler's not objecting, and I'm just tilting at windmills. 
6 Do you want the lesser included instruction or not? 
7 MS. WISSLER: No, Judge, I don't. And I think -
8 THE COURT: Tell me why it stays out. 
9 MS. WISSLER: Because I don't there's any factual 
10 basis for it. I think that your Honor has hit the nail right 
11 on the head, and you, I don't think have said it as 
12 emphatically as I will. I don't think this is a situation 
13 where this is a lesser included. This is not an "or," it's an 
14 "and." The fact of the matter is, I think the Court's right, 
15 that we could have charged an additional offense here. 
16 But the fact is that by the time Mr. Nunez had made 
17 this expression of his desire to share in this marijuana, the 
18 offer, arrange, agree was a completed offense. It had already 
19 taken place. The statute does not require that the transaction 
20 come to fruition. It doesn't require that any drugs or money 
21 change hands, only that he offer or arrange or agree to 
22 distribute a controlled substance. 
23 That offense occurred long before the transaction. 
24 In fact, it had occurred several times before the transaction 
25 had ever been completed. So if it's true that the factual 
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1 basis for the Class C misdemeanor is in his expression of his 
2 desire "Hey. Now that I've helped you out, can I have some of 
3 that," that's a separate offense. 
4 It's not a lesser included. It's a separate 
5 occurrence which has not been — it's a separate criminal 
6 offense which has not been charged, and I think it's 
7 inappropriate, as a matter of law, to give an instruction in 
8 that regard, given the fact that there is a higher — we have 
9 the reverse Shondel problem. 
10 I mean it's like charging an assault on a homicide 
11 case. When you have a homicide, you necessarily have an 
12 assault. When you have an offer, arrange, agree, you 
13 necessarily have an attempted possession in most circumstances. 
14 But I agree with the Court that this situation is 
15 different, and it's different for several reasons. First of 
16 all, by the defendant's own testimony, or at least his claim is 
17 from the stand today, he never intended to get any marijuana 
18 for himself. He claims, and he claimed from the stand, that 
19 all he did was take this officer over to this guy named Steve. 
20 Steve didn't have any marijuana, and that was it, and that was 
21 the end of the story. 
22 But we never had any testimony or any discussion 
23 about marijuana changing hands from a seller to Mr. Nunez to 
24 the officer; we just had the defendant acting as an 
25 intermediary. So he never actually intended to possess it 
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1 himself. He was simply facilitating a transaction between two 
2 other people. 
3 So I think the attempted possession is a legal 
4 fiction in the truest sense. It didn't happen. He never — by 
5 his own testimony, he never attempted to possess it himself. 
6 He attempted to facilitate a transaction, and did facilitate a 
7 transaction, between any one of four people and this officer, 
8 and kept trying until it actually occurred. 
9 So I think the problem is that this instruction, and 
10 the factual basis that the defendant is alleging for the 
11 instruction, is simply a non-charged additional offense. And I 
12 think, under the circumstances, it's inappropriate to give that 
13 instruction because it hasn't been charged. 
14 THE COURT: Anything else, Ms. Kreeck-Mendez? 
15 MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: Just one point. This isn't a 
16 reverse Shondel, or you would have got a motion that said — 
17 THE COURT: Yeah. 
18 MS. KREECK-MENDEZ: - attempted possession of a 
19 controlled substance, but the facts are different. But they 
20 are lesser; they're just slightly different. And they're 
21 lesser, just doesn't quite reach to that level that it would be 
22 a Shondel. 
23 And then it's a question of fact for the jury to 
24 decide what Mr. Nunez said as opposed to what Officer Farillas 
25 says, that clearly there are both facts, though, here for the 
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jury to decide from. 
THE COURT: Thank you. At this time, I'm going to 
deny the motion for the separate special verdict form and the 
lesser included. In no way am I suggesting that 
Ms. Kreeck-Mendez cannot, and I'm sure she ably will, argue to 
the jury reasonable doubt as to intent. 
And you can certainly argue, you know, whatever you 
want to regarding the issue that he didn't have, in your view, 
the mens rae and the evidence failed to present a reasonable 
doubt that there was not an intent to facilitate a transfer of 
drugs, but rather an intent to possess it himself. 
That's certainly a position that in no way am I 
restricting you to argue from the jury that — you're certainly 
entitled to argue the State has not met its burden of proof. 
But in my view you are not entitled to have a lesser included, 
I don't think, of attempted possession because it simply — 
there are no facts upon which, in my view, a jury could render 
that verdict. 
And I guess again it goes to the point that the law 
seems to criminalize conduct on the facilitator, who is outside 
the loop in the sense of not attempting to possess it himself, 
but merely arranging for the transfer between two other 
parties, and it seems to me that's a fair characterization of 
the State's claim in this case. 
I wonder what would be the most efficient in terms 
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ADDENDUM C 
58-37-8^ Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled sub-
stance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined 
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the 
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a 
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terras of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
•trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance, 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (4)(b) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary insti-
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (4)(aXi) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of 
age, regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first 
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years 
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this 
subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution 
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), 
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more 
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation ofthis chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation ofthis section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima fade evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under Ms direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invahd, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invahd provision or application. 
